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The paper investigates arecent proposal to resultativity by G. Jäger and R. Blutner (J&B). 
J&B say that the representation of result states of accomplishments by means of CAUSE 
and BECOME is not correct and should not be done in the syntax in terms of decompo-
sition. They develop an axiomatic approach where each accomplishmentl achievement is 
related to its result by a particular axiom. Modification of the result by "again" makes use 
of these axioms and the restitutive/resultative ambiguity is a matter of lexical ambiguity 
or polysemy. They argue that the classical decomposition theory cannot treat the restitu-
tive reading of "A De1aware settled in New Jerseyagain" (there had been De1awares in 
New Jersey but not this particular one; and those earlier Delawares never moved to New 
Jersey  but  were  borne  there).  I discuss  (and  dispute)  these  data  and  compare  the  two 
theories. J&B's contains an OT -part dealing with the disambiguating role of stress. While 
the  decomposition theory cannot deal  with the data mentioned, it can integrate the  OT-
part of J&B's theory. 
1.  Introduction 
In  (Jäger and Blutner,  1999),  Gerhard Jäger and  Reinhard Blutner (heneeforth J&B)  have 
launehed a  foreeful  attaek against the aecount of the  adverb wieder "again" I presented in 
(Stechow,  1995) and (Stechow,  1996).  There  I  defended  a c1assical  account of the repeti-
tivelrestitutive  ambiguity  exhibited  by the  adverb  wieder,  which  is  very  c10se  to  early 
proposals found in the Generative Semantics literature, notably (Morgan, 1969) and (McCaw-
ley, 1971). I argued that German surfaee syntax shows that something in the style ofthis old 
decomposition analysis must be correct. 
One of  the essential ideas of  the decomposition theory in its c1assieal form, whieh is due 
to  (Dowty,  1979),  is  that  the  result  state  of an  aceomplishment  or  aehievement  verb  is 
represented in its lexical entry direetly as a predicate under a BECOME operator. If  we want 
to  modify the result with a funetional adverb like again, then this adverb must apply to this 
embedded stative and must have narrow scope with respeet to BECOME at some level of the 
representation. For instanee, if the verb  open has  roughly the representation (la), then the 
result modifieation by again must have the representation (Ib), and the repetition ofthe action 
must have the analysis (Ie): 
(I)  a.  Ay Ax.ACT(x) CAUSE BECOME(open(y)) 
b.  Ay Ax.ACT(x) CAUSE BECOME(again open(y)) 
c.  Ay Ax.again(ACT(x) CAUSE BECOME(open(y))) 
Whereas (Dowty, 1979) says that again comes to be in the lower position through the appli-
eation of  a meaning postulate, I c1aimed that the deeomposition of  the verbal meaning must be 
visible in the syntax. That is the only difference. 
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IfI understand correct1y, J&B hold the view that this type of analysis is not right. They 
claim that the result-state infonnation does not belong to the lexical entry of the verb.  The 
entry of the verb open is simply a relation between the subject and an object (and an event). 
There is  a RESULT functor that is defined via postulates for each verb. Adverbs operate on 
verbs  modified by that operator.  This is  obviously an  entire1y  different architecture,  and it 
raises many questions about the representation of lexical infonnation and about the syntax-
morphology interface. Unfortunately J&B's theory is not worked out thoroughly enough to be 
fully  assessed. Notably, it is  not c1ear to me how modality could be implemented. But it is 
clear enough to comment on some detail. 
On the following pages, I want to compare the decomposition analysis with J&B's, and 
thereby acknowledge some ofthe weaknesses they raise ofmy approach. Partly, the criticisms 
levelled  by  J&B  can  be  overcome.  In  addition  to  the  criticism,  J&B's  paper  has  an 
independent part, namely an optimality theoretically based explanation of the disambiguation 
of  certain ambiguities arising with wieder "again". I accept that part ofthe paper and I think it 
constitutes genuine progress in Dur understanding of functional adverbs. 
The  structure of this  paper  is  as  follows.  In  section 2,  Ireport and  discuss  J&B's 
criticism of  my work. In seetion 3 and 4, I give an exposition of J&B's theory. In section 5, I 
compare J&B's approach with the decomposition approach. Section 6 reports the OT-part of 
their  work.  Section  7  carries  the  OT  -principles  over to  decomposition  theory.  The  final 
seetion contains the (non-) conclusion. 
2.  J&B's Arguments against Decomposition 
(Stechow,  1996)  starts  from  the  observation that the  Gennan sentence  (2a)  is  ambiguous 
between a repetitive and a restitutive reading, whereas sentence (2b) only has the repetitive 
reading. 
(2)  a.  weil Fritz das Fenster wieder öffnete 
because Fritz the window again opened 
b.  weil Fritz wieder das Fenster öffnete 
because Fritz again the window opened 
The explanation is that an accomplishment verb has the following syntactic structure, which 
for convenience is given in English: 
(3)  [Vo;ceP Fritz [vo;ce CAUSE [vP BECOME [xp the window OPEN]]]] 
At s-structure, the direct object moves to a Case-position AgrO above VoiceP, and the subject 
moves to AgrS. Thus, we have the following possible s-structures for (2a): 
(4)  a.  [AgrS Fritzl  [AgrO the window2 again [Vo;ceP tl [Vo;ce CAUSE [vP BECOME 
[xp t2 OPEN]]]]]  (repetitive) 
b.  [AgrS Fritzl [AgrO the window2  [Vo;ceP tl [Vo;ce CAUSE [vP BECOME again 
[xp h OPEN]]]]]  (restitutive) 
The  functional  adverb  again  can attach  to  any  syntactic  proj ection to  which its  semantic 
application makes sense. If it appears to the right of the object, there are at least two possible 
positions  which it might be occupying:  the  higher position  indicated in  (4a)  or the  lower 
position indicated in (4b). The fonner position is associated with the repetitive reading., i.e., 
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on which the presupposition is that Fritz had already opened the window once in the past. The 
latter position is associated with the restitutive reading:  the window is presupposed to  have 
been open in the past, but neither Fritz nor anyone else need have opened it. Thus, the ambi-
guity of  (2a) is simply a syntactic ambiguity and the explanation is in terms of operator scope. 
(2b), however, has only one possible syntactic analysis: again precedes the direct object and 
must therefore have wide scope with respect to the VoiceP "Fritz CAUSE  ... " and,  therefore 
with respect to the CAUSE and BECOME operators. The only interpretation here is that the 
action is repeated. We need an appropriate semantics for the functors CAUSE and BECOME 
and again, of course. Ifwe assurne the semantics in (Dowty, 1979), CAUSE is interpreted as 
a chain of counterfactual dependencies, a relation between propositions. Then the causer must 
be analysed as "Fritz has some property". (Stechow, 1996) does it in slightly different way, 
but it really doesn't matter. BECOME can have Dowty's meaning, i.e., it denotes intervals 
that separate a false  proposition from  a true one,  and  again(p)(i)  says that p  is  true  at the 
interval i and it presupposes that p is true at an i '.  where i' is either before i or abuts i. We are 
assuming an intensional framework where propositions are sets of  worlds and times. 
These are the essentials of  my account. The syntax is a bit abstract, but it fits neatly into 
what is  done in current generative work (cf.  e.g.  (Kratzer,  1994), (Chomsky,  1995), (Rapp, 
1997), (Marantz, 1997), (Ernst, 1998), and many others). 
Let us come to J&B's criticism ofthe theory now. They say that the account both over-
generates and undergenerates. 
Here is an example for overgeneration: 
(5)  John CAUSE again BECOME the window open [12] 
J&B  correctly observe that there is a position between CAUSE and BECOME, and that pre-
sumably again should be able to take scope there, but it cannot, that is, the associated reading 
is  claimed not to  exist.  This is  an  old problem,  which already troubled Dowty in his early 
work  on the  problem.  One  can  try  to  treat  the  problem  syntactically.  Most  syntacticians 
assurne that only one "light verb" is permitted above our XP. Ifboth CAUSE and BECOME 
are in V,  then no intermediate scope would be possible. This seems a reasonable solution. On 
the other hand, in (Stechow, 1996), I suggest that the reading in question might sometimes be 
available. Consider the scenario described by the following discourse: 
(6)  The window opened by itself. Mary closed it. John opened the window again. 
The reading ofthe last sentence certainly can be represented as (5). Of  course a representation 
with again under BECOME would do  as well. But it seems to me that it is hard to argue that 
the reading (5) cannot exist at all. 
Now we come to undergeneration. A criticism that I hear very often is that the theory 
cannot capture the restitutive/repetitive ambiguity exhibited by statives (Bierwisch, Frey & 
Pittner). (Fabricius-Hansen, 1983) gives examples like these: 
(7)  a.  Der Kapitän ist WIEDER betrunken. 
The captain is drunk again. 
b.  Der Kapitän ist wieder NÜCHTERN. 
The captain is sober again. 
In some sense, the first sentence expresses a repetition, the second one a restitution. I think, it 
is quite obvious what is going on here. In the first case, one period of  drunkenness may follow 
the next one, we have an "abutting" scenario and might be quite annoyed with that. We could 
express this as  one  and the same state, but we  do  not.  So one should not express the pre-
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supposed states in tenns of maximality as I have done previously. The restitution in (7b) is 
triggered by the contrastive focus  on the adjective. We oppose this to  the alternative betrun-
ken "drunk"  . So previous soberness must be separated by a non-soberness period. This is not 
direct1y expressed in the meaning of  the adverb, but it is easily inferred. 
Another putative case ofundergeneration is (8). J&B claim that this sentences, in which 
wieder precedes the direct object, can have a restitutive reading: 
(8)  weil Fritz wieder ein Fenster öffnet  [33a] 
My  theory predicts that  (8)  should only have  the  repetitive reading,  whereas  it is  easy to 
invent  a  story which triggers  the  restitutive reading.  I  accept  this  criticism. It is  possible, 
however,  to  amend the approach, based on the fact  that definite and indefinite objects must 
clearly be distinguished. We have to say that the structural accusative position is not above 
VoiceP. It is the nearest SpecXP under Voice, where Voice is filled by the an Agent-relation, 
here CAUSE in order to be elose to J&B. A related proposal is made in (Kratzer, 1994). The 
structure of  the sentence would then be something like this: 
(9) 
~ 
Fritz  ~ 
CAUSE+~ME  ~ 
again  ~ 
.  d  L  a Wlll  ow  open 
I have located the information CAUSE + BECOME in one node in order to meet the objection 
that there is no attachment site for again between CAUSE and BECOME. The interpretation 
would be achieved via functional composition. The notation L for the "root"  is in the spirit of 
Distributed Morphology (Halle and Marantz, 1993). In order to derive the word order effects 
for the interpretation, I have to  assume that definite and in particular deictic terms scrarnble 
out of the VP; cf (Diesing,  1992).  This has the consequence that wieder has scope over the 
entire VP whenever it precedes a definite term at s-structure. These changes do not affect the 
essentials ofmy version ofthe decomposition theory. 
I have to add two caveats to  the revised treatment. First we have to  restrict the restric-
ting property of the quantifier a window contextually.l  Otherwise the meaning of (9) would 
be too weak, because the sentence could be true if there were no window at the beginning of 
the opening process, but the process created an open one. This consequence of  the meaning of 
BECOME is not addressed in the literature, and it might point at a serious weakness of the 
approach. 
2 
The most serious exarnple of  (an alleged) undergeneration is the following sentence: 
(10)  A Delaware settled in New Jersey again
3  [16] 
1  Perhaps by a property variable in the style of(Fintel, 1994). 
2  See (Stechow, 1999). 
3  I am  not  so  sure  whether  this  is  a very  suggestive  example.  The  original  sentence  that  motivated J&B's 
theory is the Gerrnan sentence 
Neuerdings haben sich wieder einige Delawaren in New Jersey angesiedelt/niedergelassen. 
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J&B claim that this sentence has the following restitutive reading: a Delaware settled in New 
Jersey (recently), but no Delaware had ever settled in New Jersey before, though Delawares 
once lived in New Jersey (before they were expelled). The scenario presupposes that Manitou 
or some other divinity created the Delawares in New Jersey. 
I think that J&B are correct in claiming that a decompositional approach ofthe sort out-
lined cannot ac count for the restitutive reading where the presupposition is  that a Delaware 
lived in New Jersey.  The reason is that we have a "control accomplishment" in the sentence. 
The only restitutive reading we can have is this: 
(11)  3x [Delaware(x) & settle(x) CAUSE BECOME(again in New Jersey(x))] 
Here, the particular settler must have been in New Jersey before; this is not what J&B want. 
They want this: 
(12)  Content: A Delaware settled in New Jersey. 
Presupposition: One Delaware or other had been in New Jersey before. 
The  prediction of J&B's approach is  that  causative accomplishments/achievements  always 
have the restitutive reading with an  indefinite subject.
4  In a discussion,  G.  Jäger gives the 
following example: 
(13)  weil sich in Polen wieder ein Kommunist zum Präsidenten hat wählen lassen 
because himself in Poland again a communist for president has elect let 
The reading of interest is that on which there has been a communist president before, but he 
wasn't elected. I don't get that reading, and the restitutive readings are very hard to  get in all 
similar cases. One of the reasons might be that it is difficult to imagine an  example with a 
causative subject control accomplishmentlachievement that is tme without arepetition of the 
action.  A plausible story might be the scenario of The  Omega  Man,  where everyone has an 
eye sickness called EB. In this situation one might say perhaps: 
(14)  Jetzt hat sich wieder jemand geheilt
5 
Now has himself again someone cured 
By curing himself,  someone reestablished the state that someone is  healthy.  In order to  en-
force the reading wanted, we have to assume that the agent was born with EB, so no specific 
reading is possible. Still the sentence should be appropriate in that situation. According to my 
judgement, it is not possible to  use the sentence in this scenario. So I have doubts that data 
like (10) really necessitate J&B's theory. In many cases the reading claimed is not possible, 
and we should look for an explanation for why the reading is possible in some cases at all. We 
4  The criticism carries over to transitive accomplishments like "to open" if they are  analysed as verbs of  object 
contral. Suppose, this verb has the following decomposition structure: 
(i)  OPEN(x,y) CAUSE BECOME OPEN(y) 
Here, OPEN would be a 2-place relation meaning that X .ffeets y in a partieular way, the opening way. This is 
the manner component of the action.  OPEN describes the result. Restitutive again must have a position below 
BECOME. But then no non-specific reading for an indefinite object like a window would be possible, because 
this quantifier must bind both occurrences of y and must therefore have wide scope with respect to BECOME. 
Thus, decomposition theory seems to predict that the rather plausible decomposition (i) is not possible. 
5  The  verbs of healing and their interaction with wieder have  been analysed  in (Kamp and Rossdeutscher, 
1994). This approach contains axioms/meaning postulates as well, and it would be interesting to compare it with 
J&B. 
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might find a pragmatic explanation, i.e., the literal meaning doesn't describe the situation, but 
it is a good approximation of  a true description. 
In the following section, I want to investigate in more detail whether it is at all possible 
to  express J&B's reading in a decomposition theory. We will see that for principled reasons 
the answer is no. 
3.  J&B on "again" 
J&B say that again is lexically ambiguous between a repetitive and a restitutive adverb. Both 
apply to properties of events.  The first one says that the property is instantiated by an event 
only if  there was an event of the same type in the past. The second one says that the property 
is instantiated by an event if  the result state of the event occurred in the past. In formal terms, 
their meanings are these: 
(15)  a.  AGAIN,ep:= AP Ae.p(e) : ::Ie' < e(OBTAINS(e') & p(e'))  [26] 
b.  AGAIN,est = Ap Ae.p(e):::Is < e(OBTAINS(s) & RESULT(p)(s)) 
OBTAINS applies to  a possible eventlstate and says that it  is  real,  i.e., it occurs in the real 
world.  In other words, J  &B  assume possibilistic quantification in their system throughout. 
6 
The intuitive reading ofRESULT(p)(s) is "s is the result state of a p-event", or "in s the post-
conditions of a p-event hold". J&B use the sign ":" in order to mark the presupposition of an 
expression. Actually, the variable e occurring in the presuppositions should be bound by the 
A-operators. I will assume that this is intended. 
One might obj ect that the stipulation that AGAIN should be lexically ambiguous makes 
this theory less favorable then a scope account.  I will not raise this objection, but I want to 
point to another problem: the underlying AGAIN predicates are only defined for properties of 
events, not of states. But wieder "again" should be defined for properties of states as weIl. I 
will comment on this point in the next section. 
Recall that the theory is desigued to derive reading (12) for sentence (10), which J&B 
represent as (16) in their formallanguage: 
(16)  ::Ie [(OBTAINS(e) &::Ix(DELAWARE(x) & SETTLE  IN(e,x,NJ))):  [17] 
::Is < e(OBTAINS(s) &::Ix (DELAWARE(y) & LIVE_IN(s,x,NJ))))]  [32] 
The task is to derive this from the LF that the two authors assume for sentence (10), which 
should the following formula
7
: 
(17)  ::Ie (OBTAINS(e) & AGAIN,est(Ae [::Ix (DELAWARE(x) & SETTLE_IN(e,x,NJ))])(e)) 
Inserting the definition of  AGAIN,e," we obtain: 
(18)  ::Ie [(OBTAINS(e) &::Ix (DELAW  ARE(x) & SETTLE_IN(e,x,NJ))): 
::Is < e(OBTAINS(s) & RESULT(Ae[::Ix(DELAW ARE(x) & SETTLE_IN(e,x,NJ))])(s))] 
In order to derive (16) from (18), J&B use the following theorem, which I will discuss in the 
next section but which we will take for true here. 
6  A proper elaboration of  J&B's theory requires a possible worlds framework, I suppose. 
There is no fuH LF for the sentence in the p.per. I have deduced it from sever.1 pieces of  calculation. 
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Theorem 1: ::Ix (P(x) & RESULT(Q(x))(s)) B  RESULT(Ae::lx (P(x) & Q(x)(e)))(s) 
Furthermore, J&B assurne a meaning postulate whose content is that someone lives in some 
place iffhe is in the result state of  settling in that place: 
(MP2)  \fx \fy \fs (LIVE_IN(s,x,y) B  RESULT(SETTLE_IN(x,y))(s)) 
At first glance, the postulate seems absurd. In the meaning under discussion, "settling in" im-
plies "goinglmoving to". Certainly someone can live in some place without being an immi-
grant. He might be born there. In order to  avoid this consequence, J  &B  say that the event of 
bringing  about  the  result  might  be merely  a  possible  event.  Furthermore,  many possible 
events may have the same result state, for instance, the event that x is born in y, BORN-IN(e, 
x,  y)  would have the same result,  i.e.,  J&B  should accept the  following  equivalence, if I 
understand them correctly: 
(19)  RESULT(BORN_IN(x, y))(s) B  RESULT(SETTLE_IN(x,y))(s)) B  LIVE_IN(s,x,y) 
For the time being we will not worry about this. We accept the theorem and the meaning pos-
tulate and can now easily show that (18) is equivalent with (16). Here is the proof: 
::Ie [(OBT(e) &::Ix (DW(x) & SET(e,x,NJ))): 
::Is < e(OBT(s) & RES(Ae [::Ix (DW(x) & SET(e,x,NJ))])(s))] 
iff 
::Ie [(OBT(e) &::Ix (DW(x) & SET(e,x,NJ))): 
::Is < e(OBT(s) & ::Ix (DW(x) & RES(SET(x,NJ))(s))]  byTHEOREM I 
iff 
::Ie [(OBT(e) &::Ix (DW(x) & SET(e,x,NJ))): 
::Is < e(OBT(s) & ::Ix (DW(x) & LIV(x,NJ))(s))]  byMP2 
So J&B have proved their point. 
Note that the theory allows the subject of  (10) to have a specific reading with respect to 
again'esb i.e., we can have the following Quantifying in-structure: 
(20)  ::Ie (OBTAINS(e) &::Ix (DELAW  ARE(x) & AGAIN"s,(Ae [SETTLE_IN(e,x,NJ)])(e)))8 
This formula expresses the reading that a particular Delaware came back to New Jersey. And 
we can have the two parallel repetitive readings as weil. We simply have to choose AGAIN,ep 
instead of AGAIN,es'.  All this looks rather attractive so  far,  and friends of logical deduction 
will be quite pleased that the desired consequences come out so  nicely. But logical syntax 
needs semantic justification. So  let us investigate J&B's model theory, where the notion of 
RESUL  T, which is crucial for the approach, is interpreted. 
If we compare this account with the decomposition approach, we see that the essential 
difference is in terms of the concept of  result: the result generated by a CAUSE + BECOME-
8  This is the derivation of  the restitutive reading:iui 
AGAIN",,(1ce.SETILE_IN(e,x,NJ))(e) 
+-> SETTLE_IN(e,x,NJ): :ls<e(OBTAINS(s) & RESULT(1ce.SETILE_IN(e,x,NJ))(s))  (meaning of  AGAIN",,) 
+-> SETTLE_IN(e,x,NJ): :ls<e(OBTAINS(s) &  SETILE_IN(s,x,NJ))  (MP2) 
Quantifying in the indefinite tenn yields: 
3x (DELAWARE(x) & AGAIN",,(kSETILE_IN(e,x,NJ))(e)) 
+->:lx (DELAWARE(x) &  SETTLE_IN(e,x,NJ) : :ls<e(OBTAINS(s) &  SETTLE_IN(s,x,NJ))) 
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verb is much stronger. If a door was closed by John, then the decomposition approach says 
that that door was closed thereafter. J&B say, however, that if  a door was closed by John, then 
same  door  was  closed  thereafter.  And  if some  Delaware  came  to  New  Jersey,  the 
decomposition theory says  that  this  Delaware was  in New Jersey thereafter.  J&B  say that 
same Delaware was in New Jersey thereafter. It is  clear then that we cannot obtain J&B's 
result by the classical method. For convenience, I give the decomposition LF for the sentence 
in its restitutive reading, where s* denotes the speech time. 
(21)  3e< s*(3x(DELAW  ARE(x) & SETTLE(e,x) & 
CAUSE BECOME(AGAIN(LIVE_IN(x, NJ))))) 
Since  AGAIN  operates  on  the  singular  proposition  LIVE  IN(x,NJ),  we  obtain  the  much 
stronger presupposition that x used to live in New Jersey in the past. 
So is there a way to emulate J&B's result in a decompositon approach? The answer is 
no. The reason is the following.
9 An inspection ofthe formula (18) reveals an essential detail 
of J&B's solution:  the  indefinite term a Delaware is  analysed  by two  occurrences  of the 
existential quantifier 3x (DELA  W  ARE(x) .... So this is  not a control structure, but a sort of 
sloppy-identity structure. The LF  (17) shows that AGAINres!  has wide scope with respect to 
the subj ect. If this were not so, the existential quantifier could not distribute to the presuppo-
sition. It is Theorem 1 that enables us to export the quantifier ftom the scope of RESULT in 
the content but to  leave it there in the presupposition. But we  can have a repetitive reading 
with AGAINrep in the same position. This means that it is essential for the approach that again 
is  lexically  ambiguous.  In  a  decomposition  theory  the  two  readings  are  represented by a 
difference in scope. But it is not possible to have a restitutive reading for  an  again that has 
scope over the subject of a causative verb, because that scope position would automatically 
give rise to a repetitive reading. 
Recall that (Dowty, 1979) wants to combine a decompositional approach with a restitu-
tive again that has wide scope with respect to  the subj ect in the syntax. He has a meaning 
postulate that interprets this again as if  it were under the scope of BECOME. (Zimmermann, 
1993)  and  (Zimmermann,  1999)  have  argued  that  Dowty's  postulate  is  not  sound.  My 
approach was designed to  overcome these theoretical shortcomings and to correlate the sur-
face position of  again with the possible interpretations. 
One appealing way of attempting to obtain J  &B' s reading would be to move the subj ect 
across the board and to interpret the trace as a variable of  the quantifier type Q: 
(22)  a Delaware AQ [Q(Ax.settle-in(NJ)) CAUSE BECOME(Q(h.again in(NJ)))] 
=  a Delaware(Ax.settle-in(NJ)) CAUSE BECOME(a Delaware(h.again in(NJ)))] 
This won't work, because the meaning is too weak. The formula would be satisfied in a sce-
nario in which some Delaware caused other Delawares to  settle in New Jerseyagain. Intui-
tively, however, sentence (l0) doesn't have that reading.  The conclusion is that the reading 
J&B want for (10) cannot be represented in a decomposition approach. 
A case for lexical ambiguity might be made by pointing out that there are adverbs that 
express only the restitutive or only the repetitive reading. I am not aware of an adverb with 
the first property, but erneut is an adverb with the second property. 
(23)  Fritz erneut ein Fenster öffuete 
9  I thank Ede Zimmermann for helping me to c\arify this point. 
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Erneut means the same as agaiu, but the sentence only has the repetitive reading. J&B could 
express this by saying that the only lexical entry of erneut is  AGAINrep.lo  (Stechow,  1996) 
blocks this interpretation by the syntactic stipulation that erneut may not attach to the "root" 
LP. 
4.  J&B's Model Theory 
The  technical part of J&B's model theory is  given in appendix A of their paper.  Before I 
review its essentials, I want to say something about the intuitions that lead the authors to their 
proposal. At the beginning of their paper, J&B  discuss and reject an  analysis of AGAIN in 
purely temporal terms. These are the critical meaning rules: 
(24)  a.  repetitive AGAIN:  AP Ai.p(i) : 3j < i(p(j»  [19] 
b.  restitutive AGAIN:  AP Ai.p(i) : 3j < i(RESULT(p)(j» 
Here, i and j are time intervals, and p is a set of time intervals or set of  world-times intervals. 
We can ask then what the RESULT-function should be. J&B write on this: 
"The first idea that comes to mind is roughly the following:  result(p) is the most 
specific proposition that is always true after an interval immediately following an 
interval where p was true. This first attempt will not do,  however. To derive the 
restitutive reading of (2)  correctly, we have to  demand that the result of "John 
opening the window" is "the window is open". After an event of  John opening the 
window,  it is  certainly true that the window is open,  but it is  also  true that the 
window  has  been  opened  by  John.  So  in  the  restitutive  reading,  (2)  would 
presuppose that the window is open as a result of John opening it before, and thus 
the restitutive reading would coincide with the repetitive one.« 
(Jäger and Blutner, 1999: 10) 
The observation is, then, that a pair (p,i) consisting of a temporal proposition and a time can-
not determine the result (rJ), where r is temporal proposition as weil and j  is  a time imme-
diately following i.  Anyone who has thought about these problems will immediately agree, I 
guess. So this is not really surprising. J&B add the following commen!: 
»  W  e take this as  an indication that an analysis of actions, states etc.  in terms of 
world/time  pairs  is  too  extensional  in  asense:  even  if two  event  types  are 
extensionally equivalent at all indices their result states might still differ.« 
That might be right, but the comment is not supported by the examples considered.  On the 
contrary, in the preceding section we observed that many different actions must have exactly 
the same result for J&B II 
I would like to mention another problem that arises with this kind of semantics. Con-
sider again the restitutive reading of sentence (10). If some Delaware or other settled in New 
10  The modification of  statives would require the "third" entry, viz. AGAINstale, which is introduced below. 
11  In  personal communication,  G.  Jäger  told me this.  The sentence (i)  can be true  without presupposing the 
statement (ii): 
(i)  John is again opening a dOOf that is being opened 
(ii) A dOOf that was being opened was open 
This argument needs to be elaborated. I don't even know how to fender it in a consistent way. 
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Jersey then this must be at least one particular person, say John Yellowhorse. Therefore, at the 
time j immediately following the time i of immigration, it is troe that John Yellowhorse was 
in New Jersey. Therefore the sentence should presuppose that John Yellowhorse had been in 
New  Jersey before j.  But the  sentence doesn't presuppose that.  Call  this  the Problem  of 
Existential Instantiation. 
In order to overcome the first difficulty, J&B recur to a Davidsonian approach, which is 
rejected in its c1assical form. Here are the reasons why. Take the meaning roles (24) and take i 
as  a variable for events, whereas j is a variable for events in the first role and a variable for 
states  in  the  second  role.  As  before,  we  have  Theorem  1  and  the  postulate  MP2.  The 
restitutive reading ofthe sentence is now represented as: 
(25)  ::Ie::lx [(DELAW  ARE(x) & SETTLE_IN(e,x,NJ)): 
::Is < e(::Ix(DELA W  ARE(x) 
& RESULT(Ae [::Ix (DELAWARE(x) & SETTLE_IN(e,x,NJ))])(s))] 
We have shown that the presupposition is equivalent to 
(26)  ::Ix (DELAWARE(x) & LIVE_IN(x,NJ))(s)) 
But this is not the only presupposition that we can derive from  the presupposition in (25). 
J&B point out that simple first order reasoning allows us to infer (27) from the presupposition 
in (25). 
(27)  ::Is<e (RESULT(Adx (::Ie' (DELAW  ARE(x) & SETTLE_IN(e', x, NJ)) 
& SETTLE_IN(e, x, NJ)))(s)) 
By Theorem 1 and MP2, this equivalent to 
(28)  ::Is<e (::Ix (::Ie'(DELAWARE(x) & SETTLE_IN(e', x, NJ)) & LIVE_IN(s, x, NJ))) 
But this means that the Delaware the presupposition speaks about lives in New Jersey as  a 
result of some settling event. This is precisely the presupposition the sentence should not have 
in  its restitutive reading. Therefore the approach breaks down again.  In order to rescue the 
proposal, J  &B say that events are not the usual events. 
» Instead we propose to view events as  pieces of pure information like states of 
affairs in situation semanties. They have participants, possibly temporal and local 
parameters and so  on, but they may or may not obtain in reality.  (A better term 
than just "event" might be  "conceivable event'').  Under this  abstract notion of 
event, nothing is wrong with the claim that for  every open window there is  an 
event of  this window being opened. Events that do take place in the world form a 
proper  sub set  of the  set  of abstract  events.  They  are  in  the  extension  of the 
predicate constant OBTAINS. (The same holds ceteris paribus for states.)« 
(Jäger and Blutner, 1999: 12) 
If I understand this correctly, J&B  want a Davidsonian approach with possible and actual 
events. The quantification is over possibilia and the predicate OBTAINS says that an event is 
real.  Properties of result states like "Iiving in" or "being open" are generated by events, but 
these events are merely possible, not real. These possible events have all the properties actual 
events have and they occur in time, because time is a notion is derived from them (Jäger and 
Blutner, 1999: fn.  8). But they need not be parts ofthe real world. 
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Let us look at the details of J&B's model theory. In view oftheir diseussion, we expeet 
an intensional framework. But we are deeeived. The model proposed is entirely extensional.12 
We have three sorts ofthings, individuals (D), states (S) and events (E). For events and states 
we have the usual relations temporal overlap (0), temporal inclusion «;;), abutness (><) and 
the  like.  The  language  should be typed,  but  the  authors  are  not  interested  in too  many 
details. 13 
The model provides a relation R between events and states, that satisfies the following 
restrietion, whieh I eall Axiom 1: 
(29)  Axiom 1: Ve 3s (e >< s & eRs) 
This  should be read as:  "Every event abuts  astate in whieh its post-eonditions hold".  In 
isolation, this eondition is almost entirely trivial, beeause it neither eharaeterises events nor 
does it deseribe their result states. The only information that can be read from the eondition is 
that events have abutting states, but we don't know what R should be. This R is used to define 
the RESULT  -funetion, a logieal constant of  the language. Thereby, R gains a little more in the 
way of  eontent. 
(30)  Axiom 2:  Vs:  sEil RESULT(I»)  11  ifne [eRs & e >< s & e E  11  I»  11],  I»  a predieate of 
events. 
(The name "Axiom 2" for the prineiple is my addition.) It is now very easy to prove Theorem 
1, whieh is repeated for eonvenienee
l4
: 
Theorem 1: 3x (P(x) & RESULT(Q(x))(s)) +-> RESULT(Ae 3x (P(x) & Q(x)(e)))(s) 
I omit the interpretation funetion 11 ...  11  in the following proof: 
3x (P(x) & RESULT(Q(x))(s)) 
+-> 3x (P(x) & 3e (eRs & e >< s & Q(x)(e)) 
+-> 3e (eRs & e >< s & 3x (P(x) & Q(x)(e)) 




The proof erueially makes use of the eommutativity of existential quantifiers. Therefore, we 
do not get the non-speeifie reading for a universal quantifier. In other words, 
12  Ta give an  idea of the ditliculties, consider the  oue placl: predicate sad, which should be a relation between 
an individual and astate. In order to express modality, the sentence Fritz is sad should express the set worlds in 
which Fritz  is  sad.  But what should that be? We  are  tempted to  say,  it  is  the  set  {w  I 3s[OBTAIN(w,s) & 
SAD(Fritz,  s)]}.  But what is  SAD(Fritz,  s)?  Presumably a tmth-value,  aod  SAD  is  an  absolute  relation not 
depending on the world parameter. Then OBTAIN would encode Lewis' (1968) counterpart relation C and the 
relation I "lives in". I don't know whether J&B have this in mind. And we have to see whether this procedure is 
compatible with standard modal logic. One of the issues to be investigated is whether it is  enough to speak of 
counterparts of events and states. Usually, oue has to speak abaut counterparts of individuals as  weH in such an 
approach. For arecent discussion ofthe theoretical problems, see (Kupffer, 1999). 
13  I don't know how modality is expressed in this theory. I suppose that sentences must express sets of worlds 
aod not tmth-values as assumed by J&B. But then the OBTAIN predicate must be relativised to worlds. I am not 
sure whether these changes are trivial. 
14  J&B give a somewhat winded proof. The following proof shows that the theorem is  a direct consequence of 
the axioms. 
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'dx [P(x) ~  RESULT(Q(x»(s)] 
is not equivalent to 
RESULT(Ae 'dx [P(x) ~  Q(x)(e)])(s). 
This is a we1come result, because the sentence 
(31)  Recently, every Delaware settled in New Jersey again 
does not presuppose that every Delaware used to live in N ew Jersey at some earlier time. 
5.  Jäger & Blutner & Dowty 
It is instructive to compare the two different methods of representing result states. Decompo-
sition theory in the style of (Dowty, 1979) represents result states in the lexical representation 
of the verb.  Verbs with result states have the structure .... BECOME + Stative proposition. 
Different verbs of change have different stative predicates under BECOME. Result states are 
qualitatively described. I have always taken this  to  be the great advantage that this kind of 
theory has in comparison to  theories that speak of the "the result of an event" simpliciter, a 
notion that doesn't make sense to me. 
J  &B'  s theory is not so different in this respect, despite the appearance that the relation 
R seems to be exactly this vacuous notion. But this is not so. The qualitative description of  the 
result of each particular verb of change is described by a meaning postulate. There are as ma-
ny meaning postulates as trans formative verbs. Roughly the following correspondence holds: 
(32)  a.  Decomposition theory: 
Lexical entry for settle-in: 
AW'At'[[AW At.SETTLE_INwt(x,y)] CAUSEw't' [AW At.BECOMEwt 
AW At.LIVE_INwt(x,y)]] 
b.  J&B: 
Lexical entries: SETTLE  IN 
Accompanying meaning postulate: RESULT(SETTLE_IN) =  LIVE_IN 
We change the decomposition theory in the following way: (32a) is not anymore the lexical 
analysis  for  the  transitive verb  settle_in.  This  verb  is  analysed  as  the two-place predicate 
SETTLE_IN, which is like J&B's with the difference that it depends on world and time. We 
now add the following axiom: 
(33)  The SETTLE  IN-Axiom 
'dw''dt''dx 'dy [[AW At.SETTLE_INwt(x,y)] CAUSEw't' [AW AtBECOMEwt 
AW At.LlVE  INwt(x, y)]] 
Every model has to satisfy this axiom. Next, let us define a RESULT  -operator for two-place 
predicates as input and two-place predicate as output. There are many similar operators, i.e., a 
proper definition should take care of  polyadicity: 
(34)  'dw''c/t''dx 'dy [RESULT(P)(Q)(w)(t)(y)(x) 
~  [[AW AtPwt(x,y)] CAUSEw't' [AW At.BECOMEwt  AW At.Qwt(X, y)lJJ 
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We are now in a position to define for restitutive adverbs again (verbs of other valencies re-
quire further definitions). Each ofthese must have a transitive predicate as an argument in or-
der to recover the result-state of the property. If the predicate is saturated, we cannot recover 
the result property anymore. The other arguments must consist of subject and object. These 
can be arguments of  the individual type or of  the quantifier type. 
(35)  The meanings restitutive of again 
a.  Ilagain11Iwt(P)(y)(x) iffPwt(y)(x) = 1: 3t'<t[ RESULT(P)wr(Y)(x) = 1] 
b.  Ilagain
21Iwt(P)(Q)(x) = I iffQwt(AW At Ay.Pwt(Y)(x)) = 1: 
3t'<t[ Qwr(AW At Ay.RESULT(P)wtCY)(x)) = 1], Q a quantifier intension 
c.  Ilagain31Iwt(P)(y)(Q) =  1 iff  Qwt(AW At Ax.PwtCY)(x)) = 1: 
3t'<t[ Qwr(AW At Ay.RESULT(P)wt(Y)(x)) = 1], Q a quantifier intension 
d.  Ilagain
41Iwt(P)(Q)(R) =  1 iffRwt(AW At AX.Qwt(AW At Ay.Pwt(Y)(x))) = 1: 
3t'<t[ Rwr(AW At AX.Qwr(AW At Ay.RESULT(P)wt(Y)(x)))) = 1], 
Q,R quantifier intensions 
The unspecific restitutive reading of the sentence A Delaware settled in  New Jersey again 
could now be represented as: 
(36)  again3w t(SETTLE_IN)(N.J.)(AW At.awt Delaware) 
B  awt Delaware(Aw At Ax.sETTLE_INwt(N.J.)(x)) : 
3t'<t[ awr Delaware(Aw At Ay.RESULT(P)wt(NJ.)(x)) = 1]  Def.ofagain3 
B  3x[ Delawarewt(x) & SETTLE_INwt(N.J.)(x)) : 3t'<t[ 3x[Delawarewr(X) & 
RESULT(SETTLE_IN)wt·(N.J.)(x)) = 1]]  Def.ofa 
B  3x[ Delawarewt(x) & SETTLE_INwt(N.J.)(x)) : 31'<\[ 3x [Delawarewr(x) & 
LIVE_INwr(NJ.)(x) = 1]] Def. ofRESULT and SETTLE_IN-Axiom 
This is the simulation of  J&B's theory in a classical framework. It is perhaps not as elegant as 
their proposal, but it is clear how modality works and it is compatible with Dowty's analysis 
of  aspectual classes. There is a proliferation of  polysemy and syntactic types. But J&B have to 
assume more  ambiguity as  weil,  it seems to  me.  Their AGAIN operates  on properties of 
events only, but again can modify statives, as the examples in 
(7) show. Let us call this third again AGAIN,tate. In J&B's theory, the meaning ofthis adverb 
should be this: 
(37)  AGAIN,tate:= AP  AS  [pes) : 3s' < s(OBTAINS(s') & pes'))] 
So there is much room for ambiguity here. While this section has shown that we can simulate 
J&B's approach in a classical approach, it has not been shown that this is the optimal account. 
I would like to  finish this paragraph by recalling you the problem of lexical variation.  All 
achievements/accomplishments have result states, since all allow the formation of an adjec-
tival passive. But not all ofthese verbs have a restitutive reading for again for all speakers. 
(38)  Maria putzte die Küche wieder.  "Mary cleaned the kitchen again" 
Some people don't obtain the restitutive reading for this sentence - I do  get it. I can say that 
those speakers do not decompose the verb in the syntax and hence have no attachment site for 
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the inner reading. The theory that applies againrest to the verb would have a problem here, 
because the result state of  the verb clean is the property clean, which applies to the object and 
must be introduced by an appropriate axiom. J&B make the strong empirical prediction that 
all trans  formative verbs exhibit the repetitive/restitutive ambiguity. 
6.  Disambiguation by Word Order and Stress: Bi-directional OT 
One of the objections (Stechow, 1996) raised against an account of the different readings of 
again in terms of lexical ambiguity was that it had nothing to say to disambiguation effects 
achieved by word order.  (Dowty,  1979:  253) observes that we on1y  have  the  extema1  (= 
repetitive) reading, when again occurs in sentence initial position. 
(39)  Again John opened the door 
Dowty concludes the difference in readings must have a structural explanation, but his theory 
does  not  offer one  because he  assumes  two  meanings  for  again  which are  re1ated  by a 
meaning postulate. Whi1e (Stechow,  1996) gives a structura1  explanation for this particular 
example, I had nothing to say there about the disambiguating effect ofthe accent. 
(40)  a.  Hans das Fenster wieder öffnete 
b.  Hans das Fenster wieder öffnete 
(40a)  can only have the repetitive  reading,  and (40b) can only express  a  restitution.  J&B 
formulate OT (OT =  Optimality Theory) principles that derive these facts. While I am not yet 
convinced by their axiomatic approach to resultativity, I believe that the OT part ofthe paper 
is on the right track, and there is genuine progress in our understanding of language here. In 
this section I present & B's OT principles and show their impressing predictive power. In the 
next section  I  try  to  carry  over the principles to  Decomposition Theory.  J&B assume the 
following constraints. 
(41)  DS: Definites scramble (out ofthe VP) 
SC: Surface word order mirrors scope relations 
DOAP: Don't overlook anaphorical possibilities ("Given constituents are de-accented") 
GIVEN: De-accented constituents are given 
Principle DS is attributed to (Reis,  1987) and it is stated as  weH  in (Diesing,  1992).  SC  is 
folklore  at least among semanticists, but I  am not aware that this principle has been stated 
explicitly within an OT-approach. DOAP should be read as indicated in the parenthesis; J&B 
claim that this interpretation can be subsumed under the more general formulation DOAP, 
which is due to (Williams, 1997). GIVEN, finaHy,  is attributed to  (Schwarzschild,  1999)15. 
Taken together, the principles DOAP and GIVEN form a biconditional, something is given if 
15  It is not straightforward to compare J&B's theory with that of Schwarzschild. Schwarzschild's concepts are 
rather different, for he speaks mostly of F-marking, not of accenting. His principles are: GIVEN: A constituent 
that is not F-marked is given; A  VOID-F: Do not F-mark; FOC: A FOC-marked phrase contains an accent (where 
a phrase is  FOC-marked iff its  F-maker is  not inamediately dominated by another F-marker); HEADARG: A 
head is less prominent then its internal argument. The ranking is GIVEN" FOC »A  VOIDF»  HEADARG. 
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and only ifit is decaccented.
16  We will see how these principles must be applied in concrete 
cases. 
The ranking ofthe constraints is this: 
(42)  SC»  DOAP ~ DS»  GIVEN 
Standard OT has an input, an output and an evaluation procedure that says which is the best 
output. Here, the input is a phonetic form n and the output is a proposition A or perhaps an LF 
denoting A.  The OT assumed by J&B is bi-directional. One direction assurnes that a phonetic 
form is the input and propositions are the output. The other direction assurnes that a propo-
sition is the input and phonetic forms are the output. The technical definition is this: 
(43)  BidirectionalOptimality 
(n, A) is optimal iff 
(Jäger and Blutner, 1999: 17) 
I. (n, A)  E  GEN (i.e., both are well-formed), 
2.  there is no optimal (n', A)  E  GEN such that (n', A)  < (n, A),  and 
3.  there is no optimal (n, A')  E  GEN such that (n, A') < (n, A). 
I understand it that condition 2 covers the case where some meaning or LF A is the input. (n, 
A) can only be optimal ifthere is no n' that expresses A in a more economical way. But this is 
not enough to guarantee the optimality of (n,  A).  n could express another meaning A'  in a 
more economical way than it expresses A.  Then the pair (n,  A')  would be better than (n,  A) 
and hence blocks it.  Thus condition 3 covers the case in which n serves as the input of the 
evaluation. I take it that (n', A) < (n, A) means that the derivation of n' from A violates fewer 
constraints  than  the  derivation  of n  from  A.  Similarly,  (n,  A')  <  (n,  A)  means  that  the 
derivation ofA' from the input n violates fewer constraints than the derivation ofA from n. 
Condition 2 and 3 use the notion of optimality that should be defined here, but it is not 
c1ear to me in what sense the definition can be a recursive one. So I will simply ignore the 
adjective optimal in the two conditions. 
J&B  say nothing to the technical realisation of the theory.  Normally, OT constraints 
concern the output or the input + output. No intermediate "abstract" structure is permitted. 
But precisely this seems to be required here. The OT  -constraints operate neither on the PF n 
nor on the LF A, but on an intermediate structure like s-structure or Spell Out. It would seem 
then that the approach has to presuppose a derivation relating n and A.  For OT this means that 
the input cannot be as simple as J&B assurne, we have to consider this intermediate structure 
as weil. This is not in the spirit of standard OT but I will assurne that it is necessary for doing 
semantics. 
In order to make the theory work, J&B make the following assumptions far constituents 
in the scope of  wieder "again": 
(44)  a.  There is only one structural position of wieder. Like the negation this adverb sepa-
rates the subject from the VP. If an object occurs in front of wieder, it is scrambled 
out ofthe VP. 
b.  The object of a VP in the scope of wieder "is given by the presupposition, no matter 
whether we take the repetitive or the restitutive reading". (p.  18) 
16  There is  aremark in J&B's paper (p.  18)  that I do  not understand:  "We restriet attention here to  empty 
contexts, so one might expect that  every  stressed constituent violates this  requirement."  I would have thought 
that it is just the other way mund. In an empty context nothing is said and therefore nothing is given. 
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c.  The verb of a VP  in the scope of wieder "is always given under the repetitive rea-
ding, but never under the restitutive reading". (p.  19) 
d.  "The constituent "object + verb" .. .is given in all repetitive but in no restitutive rea-
ding." 
e.  Every sentence has adefault stress that is realised on VP. If  the VP has an object, the 
accent is realised there. If a VP contains no stress, it is de-accented. In that particular 
case, the accent has adefault realisation on the adverb, if  there is one. 
f.  A VP can only be de-accented, ifthe object is not scambled. 
Let me comment on the alleged unique position of wieder, however. (Stechow,  1996), (Ste-
chow and Rapp, 2000) and (Ernst,  1998) hold the view that functional adverbs like wieder 
and fast "almost" can attach to any projection at which they can be interpreted. Consider, e.g., 
the following examples: 
(45)  a.  Wieder/*nicht stand das Signal auf  Rot. Wieder hielt der Zug an. 
againl*not stood the signal on red. again stopped the train 
b.  weil wieder/*nicht das Signal auf  Rot stand und wieder/nicht* der Zug anhielt. 
because againl*not the signal on red stood and againlnot* the train stopped 
The negation in (45a) is not possible at all, and in (45b) it can only have a contrastive mea-
ning.  It is not difficult to  show that wieder has a wider distribution than (sentential) nicht. 
Werner Frey (p.c.) points out to me that the indefinites wer,  was do not scramble in German, 
but wieder may precede was in a sentence with a specific restitutive reading. 
(46)  Fritz was wieder geÖFFnet hat 
Fritz something again opened has 
This points to the availability of the lower position for wieder. Note finally, that the assump-
tion creates problems for the syntax in J&B's crucial example (10), whose German counter-
part would be the following sentence: 
(47)  weil sich wieder ein Delaware in N ew Jersey niedergelassen hat 
because himself again a Delaware in New Jersey downsettled has 
Either the subj ect is located within the VP or wieder attaches to S. The former option has con-
sequences for the evaluation, because we would have to  say something about the movement 
of the subject to a sentential initial position, Is it an instance of Scrambling? The principles 
governing stress assignment assumed by J  &B seem to be these: sentential stress is realised on 
the verb. If there is a direct object, the stress is realised there. If  the VP is de-accented and we 
have a functional adverb, the sentential stress is realised on the adverb. 
Many researchers hold the view that presuppositions are  given, i.e., they are old stuff. 
Assuming the theory of (van der Sandt, 1992), presuppositions may even be thought as being 
given by the previous text. A decomposition approach could say that the material in the scope 
of wieder is given. In the syntax, a verb would be given if all of its semantic components 
(CAUSE + BECOME + L)  are  given.  In J&Bs theory,  conditions (44b)  and (44c)  have  a 
stipulative flair. 
Let us look now how the theory evaluates the following pattern (J&B's (6)): 
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(48)  a.  Hans wieder das Fenster öffuete.  [6] 
b.  Hans wieder das Fenster öffnete. 
c.  Hans das Fenster wieder öffnete. 
d.  Hans das Fenster wieder öffuete. 
Here are the OT-tableaux far (48) by J&B. 
(49)  Definite object 
Repetitive reading  Restitutive reading 
SC  DOAP  DS  GIVEN  SC  DOAP  DS  GIVEN 
(48a)  **  *  (48a)  *  * 
(48b)  *  (48b)  *  ** 
(48c)  **  (48c) 
(48d)  *  (48d)  * 
For the evaluation ofthe VP, the reader is referred to the next footnote
17 Like J&B, I will use 
the abbreviations rep and rest for repetitive and restitutive reading, respectively. The shorts ns 
and ws will stand for wide and narrow scope, respectively. DOAP is violated twice in exam-
pie (48a, rep), because both the VP and the object carry the sentential stress. In (48b, rep), the 
VP is de-accented and the default accent lies on wieder. So only DS is violated. (48c, rep) ex-
hibits two violations of DOAP, because the verb is not de-accented and the VP cannot be de-
accented, since there is no intact VP. (48d, rep) is like (48c, rep) with the difference that the 
verb  is  de-accented.  So  this is  a better candidate. As usual, the arrows point to the optimal 
candidates. 
In (48a, rest), the object is given and should be de-accented. So DOAP is violated. One 
would think that the  missing accent  on the verb  violates  GIVEN,  but the verb is  not  de-
accented, since VP is not de-accented. The situation is different in (48b, rest);  the VP is de-
accented and should therefore be given. But neither the verb  nor the VP  are  given.  Hence 
GIVEN is violated twice. (48c, rest) violates no constraint. (48d, rest) differs only in having 
the verb de-accented. Thus GIVEN is violated. 
The evaluation goes like this.  (48c, rest) blocks (48a/b/d, rest), because these express 
the  same meaning in a less economical way.  And it blocks (48c,  rep), because this reading 
involves more costs.  (48b, rep)  and (48d,  rep)  are equally harmonic and block all the other 
candidates in the tableau, i.e., (48a1c rep). As a result we have that (48b/d) unambiguously ex-
press the repetitive reading while (48c) unambiguously expresses the restitutive reading. This 
is exactly the correct prediction. 
Next consider the evaluation ofthe following pattern: 
17  In an email of June 6, 2000, Gerhard Jäger writes (my translation from German [A.v.S.]): 
1.  Every sentence receives an accent. 
2.  A de-accented constituent receives uo accent. 
3.  The accent ofHead-Complement structures is realised in the complement. 
4.  The accent of  a constituent is realised in its head. 
For the purposes of GIVENess a phrase counts as de-accented only if it should bear an accent In other words, 
DOAP is violated if a given phrase contains an accent. Being an adjunct, wieder receives na accent. Therefore 
wieder doesn't count as de-accented if  - as in (6c) - it carries no accent. In (34b) the default accent would go to 
the verb. Since it is on wieder instead, the verb has to be counted as de-accented. 
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(50)  a.  Hans wieder ein Fenster öffuete.[33a] 
b.  Hans wieder ein Fenster öffuete[33b] 
c.  Hans ein Fenster wieder öffnete [34a] 
d.  Hans ein Fenster wieder öffuete[34b] 
We  have  to  investigate  four  combinatorial  possibilities:  the  indefinite  object  has  wide  or 
narrow scope with respect to  wieder and the reading is  repetitive or restitutive. Here are the 
tableaux offered by J&B: 
(51)  Indefinite object has narrow scope 
Repetitive reading 
SC  DOAP  OS  GIVEN 
(50a)  ** 
(50b) 
(50c)  *  ** 
(50d)  *  * 
(52)  Indefinite object has wide scope 
Repetitive reading 
SC  DOAP  OS  GIVEN 
(50a)  *  ** 
(50b)  * 
(50c)  ** 
(50d)  * 
Restitutive reading 
SC  OOAP  DS  GIVEN 
(50a)  * 
(50b)  ** 
(50c)  * 
(50d)  *  * 
Restitutive reading 
SC  OOAP  OS  GIVEN 
(50a)  *  * 
(SOb)  *  ** 
(SOc) 
(SOd)  * 
That (SOb, ns, rep) and (SOc, ws, rest) are winning optimal candidates is obvious, because they 
do not violate any constraint. Kote first that these block any other candidate in their tableaux. 
In other words, (SOaic/d, ns, rep) and (SOa/b/d, ws, rest) are ruled out. Furthermore, (SOb,  ns, 
rep) blocks (SOb, ns, rest), and (SOc, ws, rest) blocks (SOc, ws, rep). It is also c1ear that (SOd, 
ws, rep) should be optimal because it is the best candidate in its tableau and there is no better 
PF that could block it. What comes as a surprise is that (SOa, ns, rest) should be optimal, since 
there is a better candidate in its tableau, viz. (SOb,  ns, rest). But this candidate is blocked by 
(SOb,  ns, rep).  On the other hand, nothing blocks (SOa,  ns, rest),  so  this is an optimal (TI,  A) 
indeed. 
Again these results are  exactly as  we want to  have them.  It is  not so  clear, however, 
whether the theory really predicts all these results for the picture may change if we widen the 
range of  candidates in competition. Consider the following PF - LF pair: 
(53, ns, rest)  weil Hans wieder ein Fenster öffnete 
This candidate violates no constraint and should therefore block all the other PFs expressing 
(ns, rest). In particular, (SOa, ns, rest) should be blocked. For J&B, this is not a wanted result, 
because (SOa,  ns,  rest)  is  a prototypical counterexample against my theory.  I don't want to 
exclude, however, that the theory can be improved so that this difficulty can be met. 
I would like  to  end  this  section with aremark on Oowty's sentence (39).  J&B  say 
nothing about English and we could re-rank the constraints.  But we cannot explain restitu-
tive/repetitive ambiguity structurally, because every variant of again applies to the entire VP. 
304 How are Results Represented and Modified? 
If the restitutive reading for (39) is never available - regardless what the stress pattern is -
J&B seem to need an ad hoc constraint for again in Topic-position that exc1udes a repetitive 
reading. 
7.  Decomposition and OT 
Let us try to carry over the OT  -principles to a decomposition approach. Recall that my repre-
sentation is something like the structure (9) with repetitive wieder above VoiceP. The tree is 
Bierwisch's Lexical Semantic Structure (LSS).18  The only difference to Bierwisch is that I 
have access to this structure in the syntax directly. The principles determining givenness are 
the following ones: 
(54)  a.  An constituent is given iffthe constituent or its trace is in the scope or wieder 
"again" at LSS. 
b.  A (phonological) verb is given, if  all of  its LSS-heads are given. 
It follows  that  the  verb  öffnete  is  not given if wieder has  narrow  scope  with  respect to 
BECOME, but öffnete is given if  wieder has wide scope with respect to  CAUSE. In the first 
case,  the LSS-heads BECOME and CAUSE are not in the scope of wieder.  In the second 
case, they are. The technical details of  this would have to be elaborated, but the approach is a 
step toward a semantic explanation of  J&B's stipulations. 
Since my syntax has more docking positions for wieder, I have to compare more pairs 
of structures than do J&B. We only consider sentences with adefinite object and check first 
which candidates are best for the repetitive reading. The winners are marked by an arrow. 
(55)  The repetitive reading 
a.  Hans wieder das Fenster öffnete 
aa.  Hans CAUSE+BEC wieder das Fenster OPEN 
ab.  Hans2 wieder das Fenster! t2 CAUSE+BEC t!  OPEN 
b.  Hans wieder das Fenster öffuete 
ba.  Hans CAUSE+BEC wieder das Fenster! OPEN 
bb.  Hans2 wieder das Fensterl t2 CAUSE+BEC tl OPEN  <:= 
c.  Hans das Fenster wieder öffnete 
ca.  Hans2 das Fenster! t2 CAUSE+BEC wieder tl OPEN 
cb.  Hans2 das Fenster! wieder t2 CAUSE+BEC 11  OPEN 
d.  Hans das Fenster wieder öffuele 
da.  Hans2 das Fenster! t2 CAUSE+BEC wieder 11  OPEN 
db.  Hans2 das Fensterl wieder t2 CAUSE+BEC tl  OPEN  <:= 
There are  more representations;  for  instance,  wieder can have wide  scope with respect to 
CAUSE and Ihe object may remain in situ. This configuration would not change the resul!. 
The  SS  (55aa)  is not compatible with an LF that  gives  us  the repetitive reading,  because 
wieder occupies Ihe wrong position. I have subsumed this under the Scope Principle SC. 
Nexl, consider the candidates for the restitutive reading: 
18  (Bierwisch, 1983, 1996) 
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(56)  The restitutive reading 
a.  Hans wieder das Fenster öffnete  [6] 
aa.  Hans CAUSE+BEC wieder das Fenster OPEN 
ab.  Hans2 wieder das Fenster! t2 CAUSE+BEC t]  OPEN 
b.  Hans wieder das Fenster öffnete 
ba.  Hans CAUSE+BEC wieder das Fenster OPEN 
bb.  Hans2 wieder das Fenster] t2 CAUSE+BEC t]  OPEN 
c.  Hans das Fenster wieder öffnete 
ca.  Hans2 das Fenster] t2 CAUSE+BEC wieder t]  OPEN 
cb.  Hans2 das Fenster] t2 CAUSE+BEC wieder t]  OPEN  <= 
d.  Hans das Fenster wieder öffnete 
da.  Hans2 das Fenster] t2 CAUSE+BEC wieder t]  OPEN 
db.  Hans2 das Fenster] wieder t2 CAUSE+BEC t]  OPEN 
The  candidate (56cb) is the most highly ranked,  as  is  desired.  An here  are  the  evaluation 
tableaux. 
(57)  Repetitive reading  Restitutive reading 
SC  DOAP  DS  GIVEN  SC  DOAP  DS  GIVEN 
(55aa)  *  **  *  (56aa)  *  * 
(55ab)  *  **  *  (56ab)  *  * 
(55ba)  *  *  (56ba)  *  ** 
(55bb)  (56bb)  *  *  ** 
(55ca)  *  **  *  (56ca)  * 
(55cb)  **  (56cb) 
(55da)  *  *  (56da)  ** 
(55db)  (56db)  *  ** 
In order to complete the comparison, we would have to consider the examples with an indefi-
nite object as weil. It should be c1ear,  however, that we can simulate most of the results of 
J&B in the decomposition approach. And we have the same problem with sentence (50a, ns, 
rest). It cannot be marked as optimal with the restitutive reading and a narrow scope indefi-
nite. For convenience, the sentence is repeated: 
(58)  a.  Hans wieder ein Fenster öffnete  [(50a)] 
b.  Hans CAUSE+BEC wieder ein Fenster OPEN 
The reading in question is expressed by the SS/LF (58b). This sentence violates DOAP, since 
the  object is  given and should therefore be de-accented.  Furtherrnore,  GIVEN is  violated, 
because the verb is not given and must therefore carry an accent. As before, sentence(53, ns, 
rest) violates no constraints if it has the same SS. Therefore, this candidate should block the 
PF-LF-pair in (58b). 
Recal!,  however, that I  cannot represent causative control  verbs  in the  same way as 
J&B. 
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8.  Conclusion 
The revision of the decomposition theory can be summarised as folIows:  we still distinguish 
several  positions  for  the  functional  adverb  wieder,  the  restitutive  one  under 
CAUSE+BECOME and  one or several repetitive positions above  CAUSE+BECOME.  We 
have to  assume that accusative can be assigned to  the base position of the object. This done, 
the OT-part of J&B can be integrated into the theory, notably the principles that account for 
the disambiguation of  the different readings by means of  stress. The decomposition theory has 
some intuitive appeal when we ask why a VP  is entirely given under the repetitive reading, 
but not entirely under the restitutive reading. On the other hand, unspecific restitutive readings 
with subject control verbs cannot be obtained in a decomposition approach, as we have seen. 
We must assume that functional adverbs are lexically ambiguous if  we accept these readings. 
We have seen that J&B's readings are often not available, and we would like to know 
why this is so. There remain empirical problems for both theories, notably sentence (48a). 
It could turn out that the strategy to  separate the result state information from the con-
tent of  the verb is the correct one. The same strategy is pursued in (Kamp and Rossdeutscher, 
1994);  I didn't have the  time to  compare this  approach with J&B's account.  Prom what I 
remember, the new data discussed by J&B cannot be treated by Kamp and Rossdeutscher. So 
what is the correct view? A it stands, the issue cannot be decided because J&B's framework 
remains to be extended to cover a larger body of  phenomena, notably intensional contexts. 
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